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Unitary Judicial Review 
Bradford R. Clark* 
Introduction 
Two hundred years have passed since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Marbury v. Madison,1 yet debate continues over the origins and legitimacy of 
judicial review.  Although modern commentators generally accept judicial 
review with little or no reservation, some remain skeptical.  One of the 
strongest and most sustained challenges comes from Larry Kramer, who 
believes that the Founders did not authorize judicial review of the scope of 
federal powers under the original Constitution.  At the same time, Kramer 
maintains that the Founders expected judicial review both to prevent states 
from undermining federal supremacy and to enforce individual rights.  Such 
attempts to divide judicial review, however, are inconsistent with the 
constitutional text and contradict key assumptions held by the Founders.  As 
discussed below, the relevant materials suggest that judicial review is a 
unitary doctrine under the Supremacy Clause that requires courts to treat all 
parts of the Constitution as “the supreme Law of the Land”2 and to disregard 
both state and federal law to the contrary.3 
Brief elaboration is necessary to evaluate Professor Kramer’s thesis.  
Kramer maintains that judicial review was not clearly established at the 
Founding because it was inconsistent with prevailing notions of popular 
sovereignty.  In his view, popular sovereignty emerged from “the 
Revolutionary crisis of 1763–1776 . . . as the central principle of American 
constitutionalism.”4  For this reason, the Constitution “was not ordinary law,” 
but rather “a special form of popular law, law made by the people to bind their 
governors.”5  According to Kramer, “in a regime of popular constitutionalism  
it was not the judiciary’s responsibility to enforce the constitution against the 
legislature.  It was the people’s responsibility: a responsibility they discharged 
mainly through elections, but also, if necessary, by more ‘revolutionary’ 
 
       *  Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.  I thank Philip 
Hamburger, Larry Kramer, John Manning, Jon Molot, Sai Prakash, Art Wilmarth, and John 
Yoo for insightful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.  I also thank Brian 
Wesoloski for outstanding research assistance. 
 1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  For a recent reevaluation of 
the conventional account of Marbury, see generally Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1235 (2003). 
 2 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 3 The propriety of various judicial doctrines used to avoid and limit judicial review is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  For a thought-provoking analysis challenging the doctrine 
of avoidance, see generally William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a 
Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001).  For the classic attempt to 
reconcile judicial review and judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes, see 
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
 4 Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreward: We the Court, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 47 (2001). 
 5 Id. at 10. 
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means.”6  In keeping with eighteenth century practice, the people could 
enforce the Constitution through “the right to vote,”7 “the right to petition,”8 
“the right of free speech,”9 the refusal of juries and grand juries to enforce 
unconstitutional laws,10 and—as a last resort—”[m]ob action.”11 
Based on these observations, Professor Kramer concludes that “[t]he 
status of judicial review on the eve of the Federal Convention was . . . 
uncertain at best.”12  In order to overcome such uncertainty, Kramer would 
require specific evidence that the Founders intended judicial review in 
particular contexts.  Kramer suggests that such evidence exists to support 
judicial review in two circumstances.  First, he believes that “the Framers 
clearly decided to adopt judicial review as a device for controlling state 
laws,”13 but that “[n]o similar decision was made to authorize judicial review 
of federal legislation.”14  Second, he maintains that “while the Founders 
believed that the provisions delegating powers were not proper subjects for 
judicial involvement, many of them thought otherwise when it came to the 
rights-bearing provisions.”15  Thus, in Kramer’s view, the Founders expected 
courts to review state law and to uphold individual rights, but not to police the 
bounds of federal power. 
Although there is much to admire in Professor Kramer’s work, there are 
at least two difficulties with his proposed dichotomy.  First, Kramer’s attempt 
to separate judicial review of state law from judicial review of federal statutes 
is inconsistent with the text of the Supremacy Clause.  The Clause recognizes 
only three forms of federal law as “the supreme Law of the Land”—”[t]his 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States.”16  By its terms, therefore, the Clause requires 
 
 6 Id. at 49; see also id. (“It was the legislature’s delegated responsibility to decide 
whether a proposed law was constitutionally authorized, subject to oversight by the people.  
Courts simply had nothing to do with it, and they were acting as interlopers if they tried to 
second-guess the legislature’s decision.”). 
 7 Id. at 27. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 28; see also id. at 31 (stating that “lawyers argued fundamental law to juries, 
which rendered verdicts based on their own interpretation and understanding of the 
constitution”). 
 11 Id. at 28. 
 12 Id. at 59.  Kramer acknowledges uncertainty because “a few men reasoned that 
respect for popular sovereignty actually required judicial review.”  Id. at 51.  For these men, 
however, judicial review “was not an act of ordinary legal interpretation.”  Id. at 54.  Rather, 
it “was a political—perhaps we should say a ‘political-legal’|act of resistance.”  Id.  In 
Kramer’s view, this meant at most that “laws should be declared void only if 
‘unconstitutional beyond dispute.’”  Id. at 56. 
 13 Id. at 61. 
 14 Id. at 64. 
 15 Id. at 125; see also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 287–88 (2000) (suggesting that “[t]he 
Framers of the Constitution expected, and may even have hoped, that judges would be 
active in reviewing the constitutionality” of federal statutes alleged to violate the Bill of 
Rights). 
 16 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
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courts to prefer federal statutes to contrary state law only if the federal statute 
is consistent with “[t]his Constitution.”  In other words, courts have no 
warrant to enforce unconstitutional federal statutes over contrary state law.  
This is true whether the federal statute in question violates the Constitution’s 
“provisions delegating powers” or its “rights-bearing provisions.”17  Thus, in 
such cases, the Supremacy Clause explicitly conditions judicial review of 
state law on judicial review of federal statutes. 
Second, Professor Kramer’s further attempt to distinguish judicial review 
under “the rights-bearing provisions” of the Constitution from judicial review 
under the “provisions delegating powers” contradicts widespread assumptions 
at the Founding about the nature and source of individual rights vis-à-vis the 
federal government.  Federalists and Antifederalists agreed that individual 
rights would be secured—at least in part—by the Constitution’s limited 
delegation of powers to the federal government.  Their disagreement was 
whether this feature alone would suffice to protect individual liberty. 
The Antifederalists argued that a Bill of Rights was necessary to 
guarantee essential rights.  The Federalists countered that a Bill of Rights was 
both unnecessary and dangerous.  It was “unnecessary” because the federal 
government lacked power to interfere with the rights at issue.  It was 
“dangerous” because it might erroneously imply that the federal government 
had power to invade other rights retained by the people.  The Founders 
compromised by including the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in the Bill of 
Rights.  As discussed below, these amendments negated any suggestion that 
the enumeration of rights implied the availability of federal power to invade 
other rights, and thus confirm that the Founders equated individual rights with 
the limited scope of federal powers.  From this perspective, Professor 
Kramer’s suggestion that courts enforce “the rights-bearing provisions” of the 
Constitution but not the “provisions delegating powers” is anachronistic 
because it ignores the common purpose of these provisions and would create 
the very danger that the Founders sought to avoid.18 
The Founders’ understanding that the Constitution secures individual 
rights by limiting federal power has important implications for judicial 
review.  Professor Kramer’s work profitably reminds us that judicial 
supremacy—or, more precisely, judicial exclusivity—is at least in tension 
with Founders’ notions of popular sovereignty and popular constitutionalism.  
Such tension, however, does not eliminate the need for judicial review of 
federal statutes alleged to exceed the scope of federal powers.  Such review—
like judicial review of federal statutes under the Bill of Rights—is authorized 
by Article III and the Supremacy Clause.  Thus, courts cannot simply enforce 
the Bill of Rights but decline to police the limits of federal power.19  Given the 
Founders’ understanding of the source of individual rights vis-à-vis the 
federal government, courts should take a unitary approach to judicial review 
 
 17 Kramer, supra note 4, at 125. 
 18 For a distinct argument that Professor Kramer’s critique of the Rehnquist Court’s 
approach to judicial review “proceeds from an anachronistic understanding of the 
foundational principles of Marbury,” see G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of 
Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1471 (2003). 
 19 See Kramer, supra note 4, at 122. 
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under the Supremacy Clause and enforce both the Bill of Rights and the limits 
of federal power.  Only then could courts uphold all of the rights “retained by 
the people.”20 
I. Judicial Review and the Supremacy Clause 
Professor Kramer acknowledges that “the Framers clearly decided to 
adopt judicial review as a device for controlling state laws,”21 but maintains 
that “[n]o similar decision was made to authorize judicial review of federal 
legislation.”22  Like Jesse Choper before him, Kramer invokes the Supremacy 
Clause in support of this dichotomy.23  In Kramer’s view, “adding the 
Supremacy Clause made explicit the authority to do something that might or 
might not have been implicit without it.”24  According to Kramer, “An 
express command for judges to prefer federal to state law answered the 
leading objection to judicial review, which was that judges had not been 
authorized by the people to make such decisions.”25 
This account overlooks the dual nature of the Supremacy Clause.  
Although the Clause requires state courts to follow “the supreme Law of the 
Land” over contrary state law,26 the Clause conditions the supremacy of 
federal statutes on their being “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.27  
Thus, the Clause constitutes an “express command for judges” not only “to 
prefer federal to state law,” but also to prefer the Constitution to federal 
statutes.28  This means that, in deciding whether to follow state law or a 
contrary federal statute, courts must first resolve any challenges to the 
constitutionality of the federal statute at issue.  Such review necessarily 
includes ascertaining whether the statute falls within the scope of Congress’s 
 
 20 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 21 Kramer, supra note 4, at 61. 
 22 Id. at 64.  At one point, Kramer merely states that “the power of courts to review 
federal legislation was left unaddressed” at the Constitutional Convention.  Id. at 67.  At 
another point, he makes the affirmative argument that “the Founders believed that the 
provisions delegating powers [to Congress] were not proper subjects for judicial 
involvement.”  Id. at 125; see also Kramer, supra note 15, at 235 (stating that “no one in the 
Founding generation would have imagined that courts could or should play a prominent role 
in defining the limits of federal power”). 
 23 A quarter century ago, Jesse Choper urged courts to divide judicial review along 
similar lines.  In Professor Choper’s view, “the constitutional issue whether federal action is 
beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates ‘states’ rights’ should be 
treated as nonjusticiable, with final resolution left to the political branches.”  Jesse H. 
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial 
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 (1977) [hereinafter Choper, Scope of National Power].  At 
the same time, he maintained that courts should actively “prevent state encroachment on 
national supremacy.”  JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 205 
(1980) [hereinafter CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW]. 
 24 Kramer, supra note 4, at 63. 
 25 Id. 
 26 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 27 Id. 
 28 This section incorporates arguments made at greater length in Bradford R. Clark, 
The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91 
(2003).  For related arguments, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of 
Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 903–13 (2003). 
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enumerated powers.  The text, history and structure of the Constitution 
support this conclusion. 
A. Text 
The first half of the Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”29  Significantly, federal 
“Laws” qualify as “supreme” under the Clause only if they were “made in 
Pursuance” of the Constitution.30  By its terms, therefore, the Supremacy 
Clause suggests that courts should prefer federal statutes to contrary state law 
only if the federal statutes themselves are constitutional. 
The second half of the Supremacy Clause also supports judicial review of 
federal statutes.  After defining “the supreme Law of the Land,” the Clause 
directs that “the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”31  In 
so doing, the Clause “impressed state judges into national service, obliging 
them not only to subordinate their own state law obligations to federal ones, 
but also actively to police state law and void any (even the most fundamental) 
if it was inconsistent with any (even the least important) federal law.”32  In 
order to comply with this command, however, state judges must identify “the 
supreme Law of the Land” with care.  Thus, when a party challenges the 
constitutionality of a federal statute in state court, state judges must determine 
whether the statute was “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution in order to 
apply the Supremacy Clause. 
If the Constitution authorizes state courts to review the constitutionality 
of federal statutes, then it necessarily authorizes the Supreme Court to do so 
as well.  Article III gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over “all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
 
 29 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 30 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“Acts of Congress are the 
supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are 
declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States.”).  Scholars continue 
to debate the extent to which the federal government may adopt treaties that either exceed 
the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers or otherwise violate the Constitution.  See 
Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 
433–50 (1998) (criticizing the “nationalist view” of the treaty power); David M. Golove, 
Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of 
the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1279–1315 (2000) (defending the “nationalist 
view” of the treaty power); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 
Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 199 (2000) (critiquing Professor Golove’s analysis). 
 31 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  Caleb Nelson has recently examined this portion of the 
Supremacy Clause, and concluded that the relevant language constitutes a “non obstante” 
clause, a provision used to overcome the traditional rule that “repeals by implication in the 
law are not favored.”  Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 237–46 (2000).  The 
result, in his view, is that the “Supremacy Clause requires preemption [of state law] only 
when the rules provided by state and federal law contradict each other, so that a court cannot 
simultaneously follow both.”  Id. at 303. 
 32 James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and 
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 764 
(1998). 
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United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority.”33  As James Liebman and William Ryan have observed, “the 
parallel language of the ‘Arising Under’ and Supremacy Clauses was 
intentional and structurally crucial.”34  Even if there were no lower federal 
courts with federal question jurisdiction,35 Article III would authorize the 
Supreme Court to correct misapplications of the Supremacy Clause by state 
courts.  Thus, while the Supremacy Clause obligates state judges to ascertain 
and enforce “the supreme Law of the Land,” Article III’s decision to vest 
appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court “add[s] a yet stronger (because 
independent, final, and effectual) external check on state judges—or, more 
accurately, a checking up on or spot-checking of state judicial decisions to 
assure that state judges are fulfilling their checking function vis-à-vis state 
law.”36 
If the Supremacy Clause authorizes state courts and the Supreme Court to 
review the constitutionality of federal statutes, it is unlikely that the Founders 
meant to deny lower federal courts similar authority.  These courts trace their 
jurisdiction in federal question cases to the same clause in Article III that 
authorizes the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction in such 
cases.37  In addition, as Alexander Hamilton observed, there seems to be “no 
impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the state courts, to the 
subordinate national tribunals.”38  Rather, such questions appear “to be left to 
the discretion of the legislature.”39  Because state courts review the 
constitutionality of federal statutes under the Supremacy Clause, lower federal 
courts exercising appellate jurisdiction would have to undertake such review 
as well.  More fundamentally, if one believes—as Professor Kramer does—
that the Supremacy Clause requires lower federal courts to prefer “the 
supreme Law of the Land” to contrary state law, then the Clause necessarily 
authorizes such courts to determine whether a particular federal statute was in 
fact “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.40 
 
 33 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 34 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 32, at 708. 
 35 Congress has discretion whether or not “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the 
supreme Court,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, which implies broad authority to define and 
limit their jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); 
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442 (1850).  See generally Julian Velasco, 
Congressional Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View, 
46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671 (1997). 
 36 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 32, at 771–72. 
 37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  Professor Wechsler reached a similar conclusion.  See 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
4–5 (1959). 
 38 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 39 Id. 
 40 The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over appeals from both state and lower federal 
courts also supports judicial review by lower federal courts.  Through its power to create 
lower federal courts and control their jurisdiction, Congress has substantial discretion to 
determine whether state or federal courts will adjudicate cases arising under federal law.  In 
either case, the Supreme Court generally has appellate jurisdiction over such cases.  It would 
be odd to conclude that the Supreme Court can assess the constitutionality of federal statutes 
in cases coming from state courts, but not in cases coming from federal courts.  This 
suggests that the Supremacy Clause requires federal courts—no less than state courts—to 
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B. History 
History confirms that the Supremacy Clause authorizes courts to review 
the constitutionality of federal statutes in order to identify “the supreme Law 
of the Land.”  Delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 widely 
acknowledged the need for supremacy with respect to matters properly 
assigned to the federal government.  At the same time, delegates sought to 
prevent the new government from exceeding its enumerated powers at the 
expense of the states and the people.  To further both goals, the Convention 
ultimately adopted the carefully worded Supremacy Clause in preference to 
several proposed alternatives.  The Founders’ choice confirms that they 
expected the judiciary both to enforce the supremacy of federal law and to 
uphold the limits of federal power. 
1. The Constitutional Convention 
The Convention recognized from the outset that some mechanism was 
necessary to secure the supremacy of federal law over contrary state law.41  
As Jack Rakove has explained, “federalism questions were central to the 
origins of judicial review” because federalism “requires mechanisms to 
resolve the conflicts that arise when national and state legislation overlap.”42  
The Founders considered three mechanisms for resolving such conflicts, each 
of which looked to a different branch of government for its implementation.43 
First, the Virginia Plan initially proposed authorizing the Union to use 
military force to coerce the states to comply with federal law.44  The delegates 
were immediately opposed to the use of force.45  At the outset, James 
 
identify and apply “the supreme Law of the Land,” that is, to determine whether an 
applicable federal statute was “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution. 
 41 The proceedings of the Federal Convention of 1787, of course, cannot 
authoritatively establish the meaning of the constitutional text.  They may, however, 
confirm the apparent meaning of the text.  The Supremacy Clause, for example, establishes 
a rule of decision for courts that restricts “the supreme Law of the Land” to “Laws . . . made 
in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution.”  Notwithstanding this text, Professor Kramer 
maintains that the Founders did not intend courts to determine whether federal statutes were 
“made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.  As discussed in this section, however, the records 
of the Convention—particularly its consideration and rejection of the congressional 
negative—tend to refute Kramer’s view and confirm the apparent meaning of the text. 
 42 Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1042 (1997). 
 43 For a more detailed discussion of these alternatives, see Bradford R. Clark, 
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1348–55 (2001).  
See also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 171–72 (1996) (“In determining how national acts could be enforced against 
potential opposition, the Convention could choose among three mechanisms: the use of 
coercive force against defiant states . . . ; the negative on state laws; or the legal prosecution 
of individuals who violated or interfered with national law.”). 
 44 See Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 17, 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (proposing that the National Legislature be authorized “to 
call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty 
under the articles thereof”). 
 45 See Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 47, 54 (“The use of force agst. a State, would look 
more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be 
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Madison “observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he 
doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to 
people collectively and not individually.  A Union of the States containing 
such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction.”46  The 
Convention tabled the proposal and never seriously entertained this 
alternative.47 
Second, the Virginia Plan suggested giving the national legislature power 
to negative state laws.48  As originally proposed, this solution would have 
empowered Congress “to negative all laws passed by the several States, 
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of [the] 
Union.”49  The Convention initially approved the proposal in this form.50  Mr. 
Pinckney subsequently moved to expand the negative by proposing “‘that the 
National Legislature shd. have authority to negative all Laws which they shd. 
judge to be improper.’”51  The proposal of an unlimited congressional 
negative provoked strong objections by delegates from small states fearful of 
unchecked federal power.  These objections proved decisive and the 
Convention rejected Pinckney’s proposal to expand the negative.52  The 
Convention subsequently reconsidered and rejected even the original 
congressional negative.53  Although limited on its face, the negative would 
have allowed Congress to determine for itself the scope of its powers vis-à-vis 
the states.  This result was simply unacceptable to a majority of states at the 
Convention.54 
 
considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might 
be bound.”). 
 46 Id.  Madison’s views on this question were apparently unsettled until he spoke at 
the Convention.  See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 32, at 710 (stating that private 
correspondence suggests that “Madison initially favored authorizing the federal government 
to use military force to bring recalcitrant states, and particularly state legislatures, into line 
with national law”). 
 47 The New Jersey Plan subsequently proposed permitting “the federal Executive . . . 
to call forth ye power of the Confederated States . . . to enforce and compel an obedience 
to . . . Acts [of Congress], or an Observance of . . . Treaties.”  Notes of James Madison on 
the Federal Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 242, 
245.  The proposal again generated decisive opposition from delegates including Alexander 
Hamilton.  See Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (June 18, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 282, 285 (“But how can this force be exerted on the 
States collectively.  It is impossible.  It amounts to a war between the parties.  Foreign 
powers also will not be idle spectators.  They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and 
a dissolution of the Union ensue.”). 
 48 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 47, 54. 
 49 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 17, 21. 
 50 See Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 47, 54 (approving the negative and adding “the 
words ‘or any Treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union’” to the end of the 
clause). 
 51 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 44, at 164, 164. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 25, 27–28. 
 54 Id. at 28 (rejecting “the power of negativing laws of States” by a vote of seven 
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Finally, the New Jersey Plan would have required state courts (subject to 
federal appellate review) to enforce the Laws of the United States “made by 
virtue & in pursuance of the powers hereby . . . vested in them” as “the 
supreme law of the respective States.”55  Although this “Supremacy Clause” 
was originally rejected as part of the New Jersey Plan, the Convention 
subsequently adopted the Clause immediately after rejecting the congressional 
negative.56  Significantly, every version of the Supremacy Clause considered 
by the Convention tied the supremacy of federal statutes to their fidelity to the 
Constitution.  For example, the provision initially adopted by the Convention 
recognized “the legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in 
pursuance of the articles of Union” as “the supreme law of the respective 
States.”57  As finally adopted, the Supremacy Clause designates “the Laws of 
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution” 
as “the supreme Law of the Land.”58  Thus, under all drafts of the Clause 
considered at the Convention, courts were required to disregard state law in 
favor of contrary federal statutes only if the statutes themselves were 
constitutional.59 
 
states to three).  On this occasion, Madison reports that “Mr. Govr. Morris was more & 
more opposed to the negative.  The proposal of it would disgust all the States.  A law that 
ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary departmt. and if that security should 
fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. law.”  Id. at 27–28. 
 55 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 242, 245.  The New Jersey Plan did not authorize 
the creation of lower federal courts.  Rather, the Plan proposed that all cases arising under 
federal law be adjudicated “by the Common Law Judiciarys of the State[s]” in the first 
instance.  Id. at 243.  These decisions would have been subject to appellate review by “a 
federal Judiciary . . . to consist of a supreme Tribunal.”  Id. at 244. 
 56 See Journal of the Federal Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 44, at 21, 22.  The Convention subsequently amended the Supremacy Clause to 
include the “Constitution” (in addition to “Laws” and “Treaties”), Notes of James Madison 
on the Federal Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 
384, 389, and to make clear that these three sources of federal law were not merely “the 
supreme law of the respective States,” but “the supreme Law of the Land,” Report of 
Committee of Style, in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 590, 603. 
 57 Journal of the Federal Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 44, at 21, 22. 
 58 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 59 David Currie relies on the distinct language used by the Clause to describe “Laws” 
and “Treaties” to argue that the phrase “Laws . . . made in Pursuance” of “[t]his 
Constitution” was solely a temporal reference.  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 72–73 (1985).  In his view, this 
reading “furnishes a powerful argument against judicial review of Acts of Congress.”  Id. at 
73; see also Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (2001) (“‘In Pursuance thereof’ means ‘after,’ not ‘consistent 
with.’”); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 
1, 21 (suggesting that the phrase might “mean merely that only those statutes adopted by 
Congress after the re-establishment and reconstitution of Congress pursuant to the 
Constitution itself shall be the supreme law of the land”).  There are several difficulties with 
this interpretation.  First, the distinctive language with respect to “Treaties” was added after 
the language used to describe “Laws.”  Thus, it seems unlikely that the phrase adopted to 
describe “Laws” was intended to differentiate itself from a phrase yet to be drafted.  See 
Clark, supra note 28, at 118.  Second, even if the distinctive language used to describe 
“Laws” was meant to have temporal significance, there is substantial evidence that it was 
also meant to condition the supremacy of federal statutes on adherence to the limits of 
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The Founders’ adoption of the Supremacy Clause and rejection of the 
congressional negative provides strong evidence that they intended courts—
rather than Congress—to determine whether Congress had exceeded the 
scope of its enumerated powers.  Proponents of the Supremacy Clause 
opposed the negative in part because it would have allowed Congress to judge 
the scope of its own powers.  Assigning this responsibility to judges—
including state judges—would establish both horizontal and vertical checks 
against congressional overreaching.  The judicial branch would check the 
legislative branch and state agents would check the federal government.  
Further efforts to revive the congressional negative failed,60 thus leaving 
resolution of conflicts between state and federal law to courts. 
Recognizing the conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause helps to 
explain events at the Convention that Professor Kramer finds puzzling.  For 
example, Kramer observes that immediately after the defeat of the 
congressional negative, “Luther Martin moved to incorporate into the 
Constitution the proposed Supremacy Clause from the defeated New Jersey 
Plan.”61  According to Kramer, 
Martin’s decision to move this amendment after the legislative 
veto had already been defeated is curious.  If, as Sherman and 
Morris had suggested, a legislative veto was unnecessary because 
judicial review was already implicit, why move after the veto had 
been voted down to add a provision explicitly ordering state 
judges to treat federal law as supreme?  And why do so if you are 
Luther Martin and interested mostly in keeping any limits on state 
power as weak as possible?62 
Kramer speculates that Martin wanted “to ensure that the legislative veto 
was dead once and for all.”63  But even assuming that Martin’s motives for 
introducing the Supremacy Clause are relevant to its meaning, Martin’s 
motion appears to have been more than a mere defensive maneuver.  Martin 
sought adoption of the Supremacy Clause because he (like the original 
 
Congress’s enumerated powers.  These functions are not mutually exclusive.  See id. at 118–
19.  Third, the distinct language used to describe “Laws” and “Treaties” may actually 
support judicial review of federal statutes.  Treaties concern our external relations with 
foreign nations, whereas laws generally focus on domestic matters.  Although the Founders 
assigned nearly complete power over foreign relations to federal officials, they were 
unwilling to delegate similarly broad authority over internal affairs to the central 
government.  Thus, it is not surprising that the Constitution expressly conditions the 
supremacy of federal “Laws”—but not “Treaties”—on adherence to the limits of federal 
power.  See id. at 119. 
 60 Near the end of the Convention, several delegates attempted to revive a 
congressional power “‘[t]o negative all laws passed by the several States interfering in the 
opinion of the Legislature with the General interests and the harmony of the Union.’”  Notes 
of James Madison on the Federal Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 44, at 384, 390.  Although this version of the negative would have required “that 
two thirds of the members of each House assent to” its exercise, id., opponents again 
objected in strong terms and the Convention rejected the proposal.  See id. at 391 (“If 
nothing else, this alone would damn and ought to damn the Constitution.  Will any State 
ever agree to be bound hand & foot in this manner.”). 
 61 Kramer, supra note 4, at 63. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
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proponents of the New Jersey Plan) understood that the Clause would 
authorize courts to check federal as well as state power. 
Professor Kramer’s mistake lies in reading the Supremacy Clause as a 
one-sided provision that always favors the federal government at the expense 
of the states.  In fact, the Clause was designed to be a double-edged sword—
that is, an authorization for courts to keep both the federal government and the 
states within their proper spheres.  The Clause requires state courts to prefer 
federal statutes to state law, but only if the statutes in question were “made in 
Pursuance” of the Constitution.64  For this reason, Martin’s motion was 
consistent with his well-known desire to protect the states against unwarranted 
federal legislation.  He knew that if Congress exceeded its constitutional 
powers, the Supremacy Clause would allow state courts to disregard federal 
law.  In other words, the price of federal supremacy was judicial review.  
From this perspective, it is not at all “curious” that Luther Martin—a delegate 
committed to keeping “limits on state power as weak as possible”—proposed 
the Supremacy Clause. 
The conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause also sheds light on other 
matters that Professor Kramer finds difficult to explain.  In discussing judicial 
review, Kramer recounts the Convention’s consideration of a Council of 
Revision—a proposal to vest the power to veto federal legislation in the 
president and a convenient number of federal judges.65  James Wilson favored 
the proposal on the ground that judicial review might prove inadequate to 
protect against “encroachments on the people as well as on [the Judiciary].”66  
Other delegates opposed the proposal on the ground that it would give judges 
too much power in conjunction with judicial review.  For example, Luther 
Martin objected that because “the Constitutionality of laws . . . will come 
before the Judges in their proper official character,” putting judges on the 
Council of Revision would give them “a double negative.”67  Finally, George 
Mason favored a Council of Revision because judicial review could eliminate 
some—but not all—of the “unjust and pernicious laws” that Congress might 
enact.68  According to Mason, federal judges “could declare an 
unconstitutional law void,” but should give “a free course” to “every law 
however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not come plainly under 
this description.”69 
Professor Kramer finds it “difficult to know what to make of this 
exchange.”70  He acknowledges that Wilson envisioned at least limited 
judicial review, and that Martin and Mason “seemed to assume a broader 
power.”71  Because the Council of Revision was rejected and “no other 
motion was made pertaining to the role of judges,” Kramer concludes that 
 
 64 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 65 See Kramer, supra note 4, at 64–66. 
 66 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (July 21, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 73, 73. 
 67 Id. at 76. 
 68 Id. at 78. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Kramer, supra note 4, at 66. 
 71 Id. 
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“we are left uncertain as to what role, if any, judicial review was expected to 
play.”72  Kramer offers several possible explanations “why none of the 
advocates of judicial review thought to make a motion to add this power.”73  
He hypothesizes that these delegates either “did not think it important to 
incorporate the power into the Constitution,” or they “believed any effort to 
add such a provision would fail.”74  Kramer concludes that “[w]hatever the 
explanation, the power of courts to review federal legislation was left 
unaddressed.”75 
Here again, Professor Kramer overlooks the dual role of the Supremacy 
Clause.  Luther Martin had no reason to propose judicial review of federal 
statutes following rejection of the Council of Revision for the simple reason 
that he had already proposed—and the Convention had already approved—
the Supremacy Clause.  Having successfully urged the adoption of the Clause 
just four days earlier, Martin had every reason to expect that courts would 
exercise judicial review in the course of identifying “the supreme Law of the 
Land.”  That is why, in opposing the Council of Revision, Martin confidently 
declared that “the Constitutionality of laws . . . will come before the Judges in 
their proper official character.”76  At that point in the Convention, another 
motion pertaining to judicial review would have been superfluous. 
2. The Ratification Debates 
The ratification debates confirm that the Supremacy Clause tied judicial 
review of state law to judicial review of federal statutes.77  Opponents of the 
Constitution argued that the Clause would enable the federal government to 
exercise unlimited power at the expense of the states.78  Proponents of the 
Constitution responded by stressing the conditional nature of federal 
supremacy.79  In Massachusetts, for example, Cassius defended the 
Supremacy Clause, “which knaves and blockheads have so often dressed up 
in false colours.”80  After quoting the Clause in full, he explained how the 
Clause would actually constrain the federal government: 
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 67. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (July 21, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 73, 76. 
 77 This Article examines the ratification debates not because the views expressed 
therein are necessarily authoritative as to the meaning of the Constitution, but because (like 
The Federalist) they have “significant interpretive value as a detailed, contemporaneous 
exposition of the Constitution by authors who were intimately familiar with its legal and 
political background.”  John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1998). 
 78 See RAKOVE, supra note 43, at 183–88 
 79 See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1507–21 (2001) (discussing the 
ratification debates and the expectations regarding judicial review). 
 80 Cassius VI, To the Inhabitants of This State, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1787, 
reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
511, 513 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1998) [hereinafter 5 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
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This is the article which they say is so arbitrary and tyrannical, 
that unless you have a bill of rights to secure you, you are ruined 
forever.  But in the name of common sense I would ask, . . . would 
it not be much easier to resort to the federal constitution, to see if 
therein power is given to Congress to make the law in question.  If 
such power is not given, the law is in fact a nullity, and the people 
will not be bound thereby.  For let it be remembered, that such 
laws, and such only, as are founded on this constitution, are to be 
the supreme law of the land . . . .81 
George Nicholas, of Virginia, gave similar assurances regarding the dual 
nature of the Supremacy Clause.  He stressed that the Clause does not “in any 
manner give them this unlimited power, because this [Clause] only declares 
those laws binding which are made in pursuance of or in conformity to the 
particular powers given by the constitution.”82 
Similarly, in The Federalist No. 33, Alexander Hamilton defended the 
Supremacy Clause by emphasizing its limits: 
If a number of political societies enter into a larger political 
society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the 
powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be 
supreme over those societies and the individuals of whom they are 
composed. . . . But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of 
the larger society which are not pursuant to its constitutional 
powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the 
smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land.  These 
will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as 
such.83 
Although Hamilton thought that such a limitation on federal supremacy 
would have been implicit in any event, he stressed that the Supremacy Clause 
“expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the 
Constitution.”84 
 
 81 Id. 
 82 Letter from George Nicholas (Feb. 16, 1788), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 369, 369 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1988). 
 83 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 
see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(noting “that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its 
jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land”). 
 84 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 83, at 205.  Professor Kramer might argue that 
these statements merely restate the limits of federal supremacy set forth in the Supremacy 
Clause, without addressing whether courts should enforce such limits.  This reading is 
unpersuasive for several reasons.  First, by its terms, the Supremacy Clause is a rule of 
decision for courts.  Kramer himself argues that the Clause authorizes courts to review state 
law alleged to conflict with federal statutes.  If the Clause authorizes judicial review in these 
circumstances, then—by its terms—it also authorizes judicial review of the federal statutes 
at issue.  Second, as discussed, the Founders understood the Supremacy Clause as an 
alternative to the congressional negative.  Whereas the latter would have allowed Congress 
to judge the scope of its own powers vis-à-vis the states, a principal purpose of the former 
was to reassign this task to courts.  Finally, taken in context, the statements quoted in the 
text appear to contemplate judicial review. 
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C. Structure 
The constitutional structure also supports judicial review of the scope of 
federal powers.  As discussed, the Founders selected the Supremacy Clause 
over the congressional negative largely because the small states refused to 
permit Congress to be the judge of its own powers.85  Unlike the negative, the 
Supremacy Clause assigned resolution of federal-state conflicts to courts 
rather than Congress.  By enlisting courts, the Founders established multiple 
checks against the abuse of federal power.  Although the Founders gave states 
an important role in the composition and selection of the federal government 
(including Congress),86 they were not content to rely exclusively on these 
“political safeguards of federalism” to prevent federal overreaching.  To be 
sure, these mechanisms provided some assurance to the states, but not enough 
for them to adopt the congressional negative and thereby allow Congress to 
judge the scope of its own powers vis-à-vis the states and the people.87  In this 
 
For example, Cassius argued that if the Constitution does not give power “to Congress to 
make the law in question,” then “the law is in fact a nullity, and the people will not be bound 
thereby.”  Cassius VI, supra note 80, at 513.  His reference to “the people,” of course, 
supports Professor Kramer’s conclusion that the Founders expected popular enforcement of 
the Constitution.  But this recognition by no means forecloses judicial review as an 
additional safeguard.  Indeed, Cassius made his observation in the course of contrasting the 
Supremacy Clause with a bill of rights as a means of restraining unwarranted federal 
legislation.  Cassius argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary because it would be easier 
to prevent Congress from exceeding its powers under the Supremacy Clause.  To the extent 
that Cassius expected courts to enforce a bill of rights, he presumably expected them to 
enforce the Supremacy Clause as well. 
Similarly, Alexander Hamilton argued that acts of Congress “which are not pursuant to its 
constitutional powers” will not “become the supreme law of the land.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 
33, supra note 83, at 204.  “These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be 
treated as such.”  Id.  Again, Hamilton might have contemplated popular resistance to such 
laws, but he undoubtedly contemplated judicial review as well.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 
78, at 467–71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  Specifically, Hamilton 
made his remarks about the Supremacy Clause in the context of discussing a hypothetical 
federal statute “abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of the 
State (unless upon imports and exports).”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 83, at 205.  
Such a statute, he stressed, would not be the supreme law of the land, “but a usurpation of 
power not granted by the Constitution.”  Id.  Thus, he concluded “that the individual States 
would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority 
to raise revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation, 
except duties on imports and exports.”  Id.  These remarks necessarily imply that courts 
were neither bound nor authorized to enforce an unconstitutional federal statute over 
contrary state revenue laws. 
 85 As initially approved, the negative would have empowered Congress “to negative 
all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature 
the articles of the Union.”  Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 29, 
1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 17, 21 (emphasis added).  By leaving 
this determination to Congress, the negative would have effectively vested Congress with 
absolute discretion to suspend state law.  See Prakash & Yoo, supra note 79, at 1503 (stating 
that “in the absence of judicial review of federal laws, Congress would, in effect, have the 
unchecked power to veto state legislation”). 
 86 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543, 543–44, 546–47 (1954); see also Clark, supra note 43, at 1328–72 (explaining how 
federal lawmaking procedures incorporate the political safeguards of federalism and 
preserve the governance prerogatives of the states). 
 87 See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 
  
2003] Unitary Judicial Review 333 
sense, the Founders’ decision to adopt the Supremacy Clause instead of the 
negative followed the well-known maxim that no one should be the judge in 
his own cause.88  Moreover, by assigning resolution of conflicts between state 
and federal law to courts, the Founders established an additional and distinct 
check against abuse of federal powers. 
Both state and federal courts enjoy significant independence from 
Congress.  State courts are creatures of state law and are thus generally 
insulated from congressional coercion or control.  Similarly, by design, 
federal judges enjoy substantial independence from the political branches by 
virtue of constitutionally-mandated life tenure and salary protection.89  The 
structural independence of the judiciary works in tandem with the Supremacy 
Clause to keep the federal government within its proper sphere.  James 
Wilson stressed this point during the ratification debates: 
If a law should be made inconsistent with those powers vested by 
this instrument in Congress, the judges, as a consequence of their 
independence, and the particular powers of government being 
defined, will declare such law to be null and void.  For the power 
of the Constitution predominates.  Anything, therefore, that shall 
be enacted by Congress contrary thereto will not have the force of 
law.90 
Professor Kramer’s position that the Founders authorized judicial review 
of state but not federal law not only contradicts the text of the Supremacy 
Clause, but also undercuts this important structural check.  Thus, Kramer’s 
approach would effectively negate the Founders’ decision to adopt the 
Supremacy Clause in lieu of the congressional negative. 
 
467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“If it be said that the legislative 
body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers and that the construction 
they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments it may be answered that this 
cannot be the natural presumption where it is not to be collected from any particular 
provisions in the Constitution.”). 
 88 See Philip A. Hamburger, Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt’s 
Opinion in City of London v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091 (1994) (linking the maxim 
that a person should not be the judge in his own cause to judicial review in early eighteenth 
century England); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to 
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 646 (1996) (explaining 
that the constitutional “separation of lawmaking from law-exposition promoted the rule of 
law and controlled arbitrary government”); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the 
Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over 
Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1283 (2002) (“Believing that no one ought 
to be ‘judge in his own cause,’ the Founders established three separate branches of 
government and positioned the judiciary to keep the political branches within the bounds of 
their lawful authority.”); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the 
Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 305 (1989) (stating that “the notion that 
no man can be a judge in his own cause was among the earliest expressions of the rule of 
law in Anglo-American jurisprudence”); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 478 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (defending federal jurisdiction over disputes between 
two states on the ground that “[n]o man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in 
any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias”). 
 89 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 90 Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 512, 517 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) 
[hereinafter 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
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II. Judicial Review and Individual Rights 
Again following Jesse Choper’s example, Professor Kramer would 
recognize a second exception to “popular constitutionalism” in favor of 
judicial review to “enforc[e] individual rights.”91  Kramer finds support for 
this exception in the Founders’ understanding of the Constitution’s specific 
provisions designed to protect individual rights.  In his view, “while the 
Founders believed that the provisions delegating powers were not proper 
subjects for judicial involvement, many of them thought otherwise when it 
came to the rights-bearing provisions.”92  After discussing the views of 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and St. George Tucker, Kramer concludes 
that “[j]udicial protection of individual rights was thus established early as a 
hallmark of American jurisprudence.”93 
There are several difficulties with attempts to distinguish judicial review 
of federal statutes that threaten individual rights from judicial review of 
federal statutes that exceed the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.  
First, such attempts are inconsistent with the relevant constitutional text.  The 
primary textual basis for judicial review of any federal statute is the 
Supremacy Clause, which recognizes “the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution” as “the supreme Law of 
the Land.”94  If this language authorizes courts to review the constitutionality 
of federal statutes that violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, for example, then it 
also allows courts to review federal statutes that exceed the scope of 
Congress’s enumerated powers.  Thus, the text of the Supremacy Clause itself 
appears to foreclose modern attempts to divide judicial review according to 
the source of the constitutional defect alleged. 
Second, the dichotomy proposed by Professors Choper and Kramer 
contradicts key assumptions held by the Founders about the nature and source 
of individual rights at the Founding.  Those who framed and ratified the 
Constitution generally equated individual liberty with limited federal power.  
As Philip Hamburger has explained, the Founders “assumed that by 
enumerating federal powers, the people would remain free from the federal 
government in other respects and thereby would retain innumerably many 
 
 91 Kramer, supra note 4, at 125; see Choper, Scope of National Power, supra note 23, 
at 1577 (arguing that dispensing with judicial review of the scope of federal powers “would 
husband the Supreme Court’s scarce political capital, and thus would enhance the Justices’ 
ability to act in support of personal liberties”). 
 92 Kramer, supra note 4, at 125; see also id. at 124 (stating that while many Founders 
favored judicial review of the Constitution’s rights-bearing provisions, “all but a very few 
believed [that the provisions delegating powers] were too indefinite and too political to 
afford a proper subject for intensive judicial scrutiny”); Kramer, supra note 15, at 287–88 
(suggesting that “[t]he Framers of the Constitution expected, and may even have hoped, that 
judges would be active in reviewing the constitutionality” of federal statutes alleged to 
violate the Bill of Rights). 
 93 Kramer, supra note 4, at 125; see also id. at 78 n.303 (discussing Madison’s 
“reasoning behind his introduction of a Bill of Rights” and his embrace of judicial review).  
Here again, Professor Kramer follows in the footsteps of Jesse Choper.  Professor Choper 
urged courts to abandon judicial review of the scope of federal powers in order to “husband 
the Supreme Court’s scarce political capital, and thus . . . enhance the Justices’ ability to act 
in support of personal liberties.”  Choper, Scope of National Power, supra note 23, at 1577. 
 94 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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rights.”95  Conversely, the Founders believed that the only rights they 
surrendered to the federal government were those encompassed by the powers 
enumerated in the new Constitution.  Given this understanding, courts cannot 
protect individual liberty—as understood by the Founders—without enforcing 
both the rights-bearing and power-conferring provisions of the Constitution.  
From the Founders’ perspective, judicial review under both sets of provisions 
would have been equally necessary to preserve individual rights vis-à-vis the 
federal government. 
Third, the Bill of Rights itself refutes attempts to bifurcate judicial 
review.  The Ninth and Tenth Amendments reflect and reinforce the 
Founders’ understanding that limited federal power preserves individual 
liberty.  Accordingly, if courts have authority to enforce individual rights 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, then they necessarily have authority to 
invalidate statutes that exceed Congress’s enumerated powers and thereby 
violate other rights “retained by the people.”96  These considerations suggest 
that Professor Kramer should abandon efforts to divide judicial review and 
embrace unitary judicial review under the Supremacy Clause to uphold the 
Constitution in its entirety. 
A. The Textual Basis for Judicial Review 
Professor Kramer’s proposed distinction—between judicial review of 
federal statutes that threaten individual rights and judicial review of federal 
statutes that exceed the scope of federal powers—lacks a clear basis in the 
constitutional text.  In fact, the text of the Supremacy Clause appears to 
foreclose any such distinction.  As discussed in Part I, Kramer believes that 
the Supremacy Clause authorizes judicial review of state law,97 but that “the 
power of courts to review federal legislation was left unaddressed.”98  At the 
same time, he maintains that the “Framers of the Constitution expected, and 
may even have hoped, that judges would be active in reviewing the 
constitutionality of” federal statutes alleged to violate the Bill of Rights.99  
Kramer does not identify any particular provision of the constitutional text as 
authority for such review.  Without such a provision, one would expect 
Kramer to conclude that “respect for popular sovereignty demanded that 
judges enforce properly enacted laws and leave constitutional questions to be 
settled elsewhere.”100 
Professor Kramer might invoke the Supremacy Clause as a textual basis 
 
 95 Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).  In other 
words, the Founders assumed what the Bill of Rights later made explicit—that is, the 
“powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,” U.S. CONST. amend. X, 
would leave undisturbed other rights “retained by the people,” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.  See 
infra notes 147–176 and accompanying text. 
 96 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 97 Kramer, supra note 4, at 61 (discussing the Supremacy Clause and stating that “the 
Framers clearly decided to adopt judicial review as a device for controlling state laws”); 
Kramer, supra note 15, at 243 (“The inclusion of the Supremacy Clause indicates that the 
Framers believed courts could play a role in enforcing the Constitution against the states.”). 
 98 Kramer, supra note 4, at 67. 
 99 Kramer, supra note 15, at 287–88. 
 100 Kramer, supra note 4, at 48. 
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for judicial review of federal statutes alleged to violate the Bill of Rights.  The 
Clause confers supremacy on “the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution.”101  According to Article V, 
constitutional amendments ratified in accordance with the procedures set forth 
therein “shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this 
Constitution.”102  Federal statutes that violate the Bill of Rights, therefore, are 
not “made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution” within the meaning of the 
Supremacy Clause.  Thus, such statutes do not qualify as “the supreme Law 
of the Land,” and courts are not “bound thereby.”103 
Once one identifies the Supremacy Clause as the basis for judicial review 
of federal statutes alleged to violate the Bill of Rights, however, there is no 
textual support for rejecting judicial review of statutes alleged to exceed 
Congress’s enumerated powers.  The Clause requires courts to determine 
whether federal statutes were “made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution.”104  
“This Constitution” encompasses both the original Constitution and 
subsequent amendments adopted under Article V.  Thus, a federal statute that 
violates either portion of the Constitution fails to qualify as “the supreme Law 
of the Land.”  In short, if—as Professor Kramer appears to assume—the 
Supremacy Clause authorizes judicial review of federal statutes that violate 
the Bill of Rights, then the Clause a fortiori authorizes judicial review of 
statutes that exceed the limits of federal power under the original Constitution. 
The only potential way to avoid this conclusion would be to demonstrate 
that the Founders understood the Supremacy Clause’s reference to “[t]his 
Constitution” to encompass “the rights-bearing provisions” of the 
Constitution105 but not “the provisions delegating powers.”106  Even if one 
accepts Professor Kramer’s premise that a clear constitutional text can be 
overridden by the ratifiers’ contrary expectations, he has not even attempted 
such a demonstration.  Nor is one possible.  As the next section explains, the 
Founders understood the rights-bearing and powers-conferring provisions of 
the Constitution to be mutually reinforcing means of accomplishing the same 
ends—limiting federal powers and preserving individual rights.107  Thus, if 
they anticipated judicial review with respect to either set of provisions, they 
almost certainly expected judicial review with respect to the other. 
B. Linking Individual Rights to the Scope of Federal Powers 
Professor Kramer maintains that the Founders had “disparate 
expectations for what courts should do when it came to different sorts of 
 
 101 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 102 U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). 
 103 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Kramer, supra note 4, at 125. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Professor Kramer might look to Article III, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, or the 
Oath Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3, as an alternative textual basis for judicial review to 
enforce the rights-bearing provisions of the Constitution.  Like the Supremacy Clause, 
however, these provisions are worded generally and thus appear to support judicial review 
of all federal statutes alleged to violate the Constitution or none at all. 
  
2003] Unitary Judicial Review 337 
questions.”108  In his view, “the scope of judicial review in areas like . . . 
individual rights may have little relevance when it comes to assessing the 
Court’s practice in the historically distinct domain of federalism.”109  
Kramer’s attempt to separate individual rights from questions regarding the 
scope of federal power, however, is historically inaccurate and ultimately 
unpersuasive.  There is substantial evidence arising from the debate over a 
Bill of Rights that the Founders understood individual rights vis-à-vis the 
federal government to depend in large measure on the limited nature of 
federal power.  Given this understanding, it is anachronistic to distinguish 
sharply between judicial review under the Bill of Rights and judicial review of 
the scope of federal powers. 
1. Disputing the Necessity of a Bill of Rights 
The Founders paid relatively little attention to the enumeration of 
individual rights as such at the Constitutional Convention, focusing instead 
almost exclusively on the structure of the new federal government and the 
scope of its powers.  As originally adopted, the Constitution specified only a 
handful of rights against the federal government, such as the prohibitions 
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,110 and the right to a jury trial 
in criminal cases.111  Late in the Convention, Charles Pinckney submitted a 
list of proposals to be referred to the Committee of Detail, including 
provisions that would have guaranteed several now familiar rights.112  
Pinckney proposed preserving the “liberty of the Press” and preventing the 
involuntary quartering of troops in time of peace.113  These proposals were 
referred to the Committee of Detail “without debate or consideration,”114 but 
failed to emerge from the Committee. 
A few weeks later, George Mason stated that he “wished the plan had 
been prefaced with a Bill of Rights,” and suggested that “with the aid of the 
State declarations, a bill might be prepared in a few hours.”115  Elbridge Gerry 
“moved for a Committee to prepare a Bill of Rights,” but the motion was 
defeated unanimously without substantial discussion.116  Finally, Pinckney 
and Gerry made a more modest motion “to insert a declaration ‘that the liberty 
of the Press should be inviolably observed.’”117  Roger Sherman argued that 
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the declaration was “unnecessary” because the “power of Congress does not 
extend to the Press.”118  The Convention apparently agreed and rejected the 
motion by a vote of seven states to four.119 
Interest in adding a Bill of Rights, of course, did not end with the 
Convention.  As Arthur Wilmarth has explained, the absence of such 
guarantees became a rallying cry for Antifederalists opposed to ratification.120  
The Federalists’ response was twofold.  They argued that a Bill of Rights was 
both “unnecessary” and “dangerous.”121  A Bill of Rights was unnecessary 
because the Constitution gives the federal government only enumerated, and 
therefore limited, powers.  As Hamilton put it, “why declare that things shall 
not be done which there is no power to do?”122  As discussed further below, 
Federalists also argued that a Bill of Rights was dangerous because it might 
suggest, contrary to the doctrine of enumerated federal powers, that Congress 
otherwise had implied power under the original Constitution to invade the 
rights singled out for protection.123  These objections were repeated 
throughout the ratification debates. 
The Federalists’ first argument was that the Constitution’s enumeration 
of powers effectively constrained the federal government’s ability to invade 
the rights that concerned Antifederalists.124  In discussing the necessity of a 
Bill of Rights, many speakers focused on the liberty of the press.  Alexander 
Hamilton inquired, “Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the 
press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions 
may be imposed?”125  Echoing the language of the Supremacy Clause, James 
Wilson made a similar point in Pennsylvania: 
In answer to the gentleman from Fayette (John Smilie) on the 
subject of the press, I beg leave to make an observation; it is very 
true, sir, that this Constitution says nothing with regard to that 
subject, nor was it necessary, because it will be found that there is 
given to the general government no power whatsoever concerning 
it; and no law in pursuance of the Constitution can possibly be 
enacted to destroy that liberty.126 
Also in Pennsylvania, “One of the People” wrote, “Their power is 
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defined and limited by the 8th section of the first Article of the Constitution, 
and they have not power to take away the freedom of the press . . . .”127  
Edmund Randolph reiterated these views in Virginia: “Go through these 
powers, examine every one and tell me if the most exalted genius can prove 
that the liberty of the press is in danger.”128  One of the “Middling-Interest” 
made the same point in Massachusetts: “The opposers of the new government 
have branched out the evils arising from the pretended want of a declaration 
of rights into several particulars—one of which is, that the LIBERTY OF 
THE PRESS is not provided for—But the real question is, where is it taken 
away?”129  And, in Connecticut, Roger Sherman observed, “The liberty of the 
Press can be in no danger, because that is not put under the direction of the 
new government.”130 
In these discussions, leading Federalists used the liberty of the press 
simply as one example to make their larger point that “[l]iberty is secured . . . 
by the limitation of [federal] powers.”131  For instance, after contrasting the 
powers of the states with those of the federal government, James Wilson 
explained that a Bill of Rights was necessary to restrain the former but not the 
latter because the federal government was one of enumerated powers: 
When the people established the powers of legislation under their 
separate governments, they invested their representatives with 
every right and authority which they did not in explicit terms 
reserve . . . .  But in delegating federal powers, another criterion 
was necessarily introduced, and the congressional authority is to 
be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive grant 
expressed in the instrument of union.  Hence it is evident, that in 
the former case everything which is not reserved is given, but in 
the latter the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything 
which is not given, is reserved.  This distinction being recognized, 
will furnish an answer to those who think the omission of a bill of 
rights, a defect in the proposed Constitution: for it would have 
been superfluous and absurd to have stipulated with a federal body 
of our own creation, that we should enjoy those privileges, of 
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which we are not divested either by the intention or the act, that 
has brought that body into existence.132 
Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania also equated individual rights with the 
absence of federal power: 
As soon as the independence of America was declared in the year 
1776, from that instant all our natural rights were restored to us, 
and we were at liberty to adopt any form of government to which 
our views or our interests might incline us.  This truth, expressly 
recognized by the act, declaring our independence, naturally 
produced another maxim, that whatever portion of those natural 
rights we did not transfer to the government was still reserved and 
retained by the people; for, if no power was delegated to the 
government, no right was resigned by the people; and if a part 
only of our national rights was delegated, is it not absurd to assert 
that we have relinquished the whole?  Where then is the necessity 
of a formal declaration that those rights are still retained, of the 
resignation of which no evidence can possibly be produced?133 
Edmund Pendleton made the same point in rejecting the need for 
amendments to establish the right to “trial by Jury” and “the Liberty of the 
Press”: “[I]s it not Safer to trust the two first rights to the Broad & Sure 
ground of this Principle—that the people being Established in the Grant itself 
as the Fountain of Power, retain every thing which is not granted?”134 
In sum, Federalists generally regarded individual rights and limited 
federal power as essentially synonymous.135  As a Massachusetts newspaper 
put it: “So, as the people now possess all the rights and all the power of 
freemen, what can the Congress have to do with those rights which they keep 
at home—which they do not throw into the common stock—over which they 
do not expressly give Congress any power?”136  Hugh Williamson expressed 
the same understanding in North Carolina: “It is granted, and perfectly 
understood, that under the Government of the Assemblies of the States, and 
under the Government of the Congress, every right is reserved to the 
individual, which he has not expressly delegated to this, or that 
Legislature.”137  Another commentator put the point more colorfully in 
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Massachusetts: “The first section in the federal form will help our eye-sight, if 
we are not determined to be blind, to see that we retain all our rights, which 
we have not expressly relinquished to the union.”138 
Thus, there was widespread recognition among the Founders that 
individual rights vis-à-vis the federal government would be protected, at least 
in part, by the limited delegation of power to Congress under the new 
Constitution.  Such recognition essentially forecloses any suggestion that 
courts could employ judicial review to protect individual rights but not to 
police the bounds of federal power.  If the Founders hoped courts would 
protect individual rights under the new Constitution, then they necessarily 
hoped courts would keep Congress from invading such rights by exceeding 
the scope of its enumerated powers. 
2. The Danger That a Bill of Rights Could Expand Federal Power 
Many Founders feared that a Bill of Rights was not only unnecessary, but 
also dangerous to the rights of the people.139  This fear rested on the 
widespread assumption that individual rights were secured by the limited 
nature of Congress’s powers.  During the ratification period, many believed 
that a Bill of Rights—although intended to secure individual rights—would 
actually undermine such rights by unintentionally enlarging the scope of 
federal power by implication.  Specifically, a Bill of Rights might have 
wrongly suggested that Congress had power under the original Constitution to 
violate the rights secured.  Because it was impossible to specify all of the 
rights held against the federal government, a Bill of Rights might erroneously 
imply that Congress had power over other rights not specified and thus leave 
unenumerated rights less secure.140  As Alexander Hamilton warned, a Bill of 
Rights “would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; 
and on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than 
were granted.”141 
Numerous participants in state ratifying conventions agreed that a Bill of 
Rights “would be not only unnecessary, but preposterous and dangerous.”142  
Equating individual rights with reserved powers, James Wilson explained this 
danger in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention: 
A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the 
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powers reserved.  If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is 
not enumerated is presumed to be given.  The consequence is, that 
an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the 
scale of the government; and the rights of the people would be 
rendered incomplete.143 
This danger was widely cited in opposition to a Bill of Rights.  Samuel 
Holden Parsons, of Connecticut, wrote, “Every power not granted rests where 
all power was before lodged—and establishing any other bill of rights would 
be dangerous, as it would at least imply that nothing more was left with the 
people than the rights defined and secured in such bill of rights.”144 
Similarly, Silas Lee, of Massachusetts, thought that a Bill of Rights could 
make the Constitution “far more dangerous” because “instead of lessening the 
powers of Congress, such a Bill would actually enlarge them—for instead of 
the Constitution’s being the limits or boundary line of Congress, the Bill of 
Rights only would be the sacred barrier, or mark not to be exceeded.”145  
James Madison also recognized the danger posed by a Bill of Rights, given 
his understanding that individual rights rested primarily on limited federal 
power.  He asked rhetorically in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, “Can the 
General Government exercise any power not delegated?  If an enumeration be 
made of our rights, will it not be implied, that every thing omitted, is given to 
the General Government?”146 
C. Perfecting the Bill of Rights: The Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
The Founders ultimately responded to this danger by including the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments in the Bill of Rights.  These amendments represent 
formal recognition in the constitutional text that individual rights vis-à-vis the 
federal government rest not only on the rights-bearing provisions of the 
Constitution, but also on the limited scope of enumerated powers.147  
Although modern commentators have sought to expand the role of the Ninth 
Amendment to encompass unwritten or natural rights,148 it is difficult to deny 
 
 143 Id. 
 144 Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 569, 569 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1978) [hereinafter 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
 145 Letter from Silas Lee to George Thatcher (Jan. 23, 1788), in 5 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 80, at 780, 781. 
 146 Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 24, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1473, 1501–02 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993); see also Cassius II, To Richard Henry Lee, Esquire, VA. 
INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1788, reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 128, at 
713, 715 (“But, as Congress can exercise no power, except such as are expressly given to 
them by the people, a bill of rights is, not only, unnecessary, but, would be, highly 
dangerous.  Because, if an enumeration was made, it might, then be supposed, that every 
right was given up, but what was reserved.”). 
 147 See generally McAffee, supra note 123; Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1980). 
 148 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 367–83 (1988); CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE CONSTITUTION’S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS (1995); 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE 
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 
1993); 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH 
  
2003] Unitary Judicial Review 343 
that the Amendment was originally designed (at least in part) to reinforce the 
limits of federal power.  As discussed, Federalists and Antifederalists 
generally agreed during the ratification period that the new Constitution 
should limit federal power and protect individual rights, but differed over how 
best to achieve these goals.  Antifederalists thought that relying solely on an 
enumeration of federal powers without a Bill of Rights would leave individual 
rights insecure.  Federalists countered that adding a Bill of Rights would 
imply greater federal powers and thus actually threaten rather than protect 
individual liberty. 
Ultimately, the Founders’ solution to this dilemma was to proceed with a 
Bill of Rights, but to include provisions expressly negating any implied 
increase in federal powers or surrender of individual rights.  This solution was 
originally proposed by Antifederalists during the ratification debates.  For 
example, the Federal Farmer suggested that “we might advantageously 
enumerate the powers given, and then in general words . . . declare all powers, 
rights and privileges, are reserved, which are not explicitly and expressly 
given up.”149  George Mason pressed this solution at the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention: 
[T]here ought to be some express declaration in the Constitution, 
asserting that rights not given to the general government were 
retained by the states. . . . [U]nless this was done, many valuable 
and important rights would be concluded to be given up by 
implication.150 
The Founders’ decision to adopt this approach undercuts Professor 
Kramer’s suggestion that “the scope of judicial review in areas like . . . 
individual rights may have little relevance when it comes to assessing the 
Court’s practice in the historically distinct domain of federalism.” 151 
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Although the absence of a Bill of Rights did not prevent the minimum 
number of states from ultimately ratifying the Constitution, it did pose a 
potential threat to the future stability of the Union.  Only four of the first nine 
states (Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut) ratified the 
Constitution without substantial discussion of amendments.152  Two 
conventions (Pennsylvania and Maryland) ratified, but appended minority 
reports urging alterations and amendments.153  Three states (Massachusetts, 
South Carolina, and New Hampshire) ratified the Constitution, but proposed a 
variety of alterations or amendments for consideration by Congress.154  Both 
Virginia and New York ratified the Constitution, but called for a second 
federal convention to adopt amendments.155  North Carolina proposed 
additional amendments and refused to ratify the Constitution until 
amended.156  Finally, Rhode Island rejected the Constitution in a special 
election and refused to reconsider before the First Federal Congress.157 
These events made a strong impression on James Madison,158 who won 
election to the First Congress from Virginia only after reversing his earlier 
position and publicly supporting consideration of a Bill of Rights by 
Congress.159  True to his word, Madison introduced a set of amendments in 
the House on June 8, 1789.160  In addition to singling out specific individual 
rights for protection, Madison proposed more general protections in the form 
of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  The Tenth Amendment was the only 
provision of the Bill of Rights “proposed by every one of the state ratifying 
conventions that proposed amendments.”161  The Ninth Amendment, by 
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contrast, was an innovation specifically designed to guard against the danger 
posed by adding a finite Bill of Rights.  As one member of the House 
explained, “unless you except every right from the grant of power, those 
omitted are inferred to be resigned to the discretion of the government.”162 
Upon introducing the Bill of Rights in the first Congress, Madison 
underscored the function of the Ninth Amendment: 
It has been objected also against the bill of rights, that, by 
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would 
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; 
and it might follow, by implication, that those rights which were 
not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the 
General Government, and were consequently insecure.  This is 
one of the most plausible arguments I ever heard urged against the 
admission of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be 
guarded against.  I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by 
turning to the last clause of the 4th resolution.163 
As originally introduced, the clause to which Madison referred provided: 
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in 
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish 
the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to 
enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as 
actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater 
caution.164 
As amended, this proposal became the Ninth Amendment,165 and seemed 
to answer the most serious objections to a Bill of Rights.  The Amendment 
ensured that the Bill of Rights would be understood not as an enlargement of 
federal powers, but merely “as an enumeration of exceptions to the 
enumeration of powers.”166  Thus, for example, although Richard Parker still 
thought “a Bill of rights not necessary,”167 he conceded that “I have no 
objection to such a bill of Rights as has been proposed by Mr. Maddison [sic] 
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because we declare that we do not abridge our Rights by the reservation but 
that we retain all we have not specifically given.”168 
For Madison, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were designed to work 
together to guard against the same danger: unwarranted expansion of federal 
power at the expense of individual rights.169  As he explained in a letter to 
George Washington, “If a line can be drawn between the power granted and 
the rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether the latter be 
secured by declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that the former shall 
not be extended.”170  The Ninth and Tenth Amendments, however, are not 
“wholly redundant” of each other.171  Rather, as Akhil Amar has explained, 
“each amendment complements the other without duplicating it.”172  
According to Professor Amar, “[t]he Tenth says that Congress must point to 
some explicit or implicit enumerated power before it can act,”173 while “the 
Ninth warns readers not to infer from the mere enumeration of a right in the 
Bill of Rights that implicit federal power in fact exists in a given domain.”174 
The history of the Bill of Rights confirms that the Founders understood 
that individual rights begin where federal power ends.  Because they could not 
agree whether liberty would be best protected by limiting powers or 
enumerating rights, they ultimately adopted both mechanisms.  As Professor 
Hamburger explained: 
Thus, the Constitution reserved rights in two diametrically 
opposite ways.  By specifying powers, it reserved to the people 
the undifferentiated mass of liberty they did not grant to the 
federal government—a general reservation of rights confirmed 
and preserved through the Ninth Amendment.  By specifying 
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rights, the Constitution reserved some particular rights so that, for 
these, Americans would not have to rely merely upon the 
enumeration of powers.  The distinct advantage of each method of 
reserving rights was repeatedly pointed out by its proponents.175 
For this reason, it is historically inaccurate for modern commentators to 
draw a bright line between the Constitution’s rights-bearing provisions and its 
power-granting provisions.176  Both sets of provisions were understood to be 
interlocking mechanisms designed to safeguard individual liberty. 
D. Judicial Review Under the Bill of Rights 
Professor Kramer believes that the “Framers of the Constitution 
expected, and may even have hoped, that judges would be active in reviewing 
the constitutionality” of federal statutes alleged to violate the Bill of Rights.177  
There is substantial evidence to support this conclusion.  At the outset, it is 
worth noting that many of the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights govern the 
functioning of the judiciary itself.  For example, the Fourth Amendment 
provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”;178 the Fifth 
Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself”;179 the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal 
defendants “the right to a speedy and public trial”;180 the Seventh Amendment 
preserves “the right of trial by jury” in civil cases;181 and the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of “[e]xcessive bail,” “excessive fines,” 
or “cruel and unusual punishments.”182  These provisions would be ineffectual 
if courts could not follow their commands in the face of contrary federal 
statutes. 
One might attempt to confine judicial review to those provisions of the 
Bill of Rights addressed specifically to the judiciary.  Under this approach, 
provisions designed to restrict Congress (such as the First Amendment) would 
essentially give rise to nonjusticiable political questions.  There is little 
support, however, for this approach.  To the contrary, there is crucial evidence 
that the Founders expected courts to enforce the Bill of Rights in its entirety.  
For example, on March 15, 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison 
in part to underscore “the legal check which it puts into the hands of the 
judiciary”: 
[I]n the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights you omit one 
which has a great weight with me, the legal check which it puts 
into the hands of the judiciary.  [T]his body, which if rendered 
independent & kept strictly to their own department merits great 
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confidence for their learning & integrity.183 
Madison agreed and reiterated Jefferson’s point when he introduced the 
Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives a few months later.  
Responding to the argument that a Bill of Rights was “unnecessary” because 
similar declarations had “been violated” in “a few particular states,”184 
Madison explained that judicial review would guard against similar violations 
by the federal government: 
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent 
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner 
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable 
bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or 
executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment 
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the 
declaration of rights.185 
This is an express statement by the sponsor of the Bill of Rights that 
courts would enforce the proposed amendments against “every encroachment 
upon rights” and against “every assumption of power.”186  Significantly, no 
member of the House rose to dispute Madison’s understanding.  At this point, 
judicial review to enforce the Constitution was apparently uncontroversial. 
III. Implications for Judicial Review 
The Supremacy Clause and the Bill of Rights provide strong evidence 
that the Founders expected courts to review federal statutes to ensure 
compliance with all parts of “[t]his Constitution.”187  The decision to include 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in the Bill of Rights confirms the Founders’ 
understanding that “the rights retained” by the people could be secured by 
“declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that [the power granted] shall not 
be extended.”188  As Madison explained, both methods “would seem to be the 
same thing.”189  Thus, contrary to modern suggestions, courts cannot separate 
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judicial review of the scope of federal power from judicial review to enforce 
individual rights without threatening many of the rights “retained by the 
people.” 
This “enumerated-powers, federalism-based reading”190 of the Ninth 
Amendment suggests that the people retained innumerable rights against the 
federal government.191  These include what Philip Hamburger describes as 
“trivial rights,”192 echoing the language of Federalists who used sarcasm and 
ridicule following ratification to make their point that the Bill of Rights was 
either unnecessary or dangerous.193  For example, in debating the need for an 
amendment to secure the right of assembly, Representative Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts maintained that an enumeration of this right was unnecessary.  
Specifically, he thought both that the right of assembly “is a self-evident, 
unalienable right which the people possess” and have not authorized Congress 
to abridge;194 and that the right, in any event, was already implicit in the 
freedom of speech.195  Sedgwick argued that if an amendment for this purpose 
was necessary, then the House 
might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they 
might have declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat 
if he pleased; that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed 
when he thought proper; but [I] would ask the gentleman whether 
he thought it necessary to enter these trifles in a declaration of 
rights, in a Government where none of them were intended to be 
infringed.196 
As Professor Hamburger points out, Sedgwick’s remarks echoed earlier 
arguments made during the ratification debates.197 
For example, in December 1787, Oliver Ellsworth responded to 
Antifederalist complaints that the Constitution failed to secure the liberty of 
the press by equating this omission with the failure to specify numerous other 
rights: 
Nor is liberty of conscience, or of matrimony, or of burial of the 
dead; it is enough that Congress have no power to prohibit either, 
and can have no temptation.  This objection is answered in that the 
states have all the power originally, and Congress have only what 
the states grant them.198 
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Ellsworth’s point was that the Constitution protected individual liberty by 
limiting federal power.  As Thomas McAffee put it, “the founding generation 
was very comfortable with the idea that structural provisions, including 
provisions that define governmental powers and clarify that powers not 
granted are reserved, constitute individual rights provisions of the first 
order.”199  The Ninth Amendment reflects this understanding, and ensures that 
the “enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed 
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”200 
Professor Kramer fails to appreciate the relationship between individual 
rights and limited federal powers reflected in the Ninth Amendment.  In his 
view, “[t]he most logical reading of the Ninth Amendment’s reference to 
‘other’ rights ‘retained by the people’ . . . is to rights already or potentially 
secured within the customary constitutional tradition.”201  To be fair, Kramer 
made this observation in the course of refuting the conclusion of modern 
commentators that the Amendment “was meant to preserve recognition of 
some ill-defined body of natural rights.”202  But neither the “customary 
constitution” interpretation nor the “natural rights” approach actually reflects 
how Madison understood the Amendment in historical context.  As discussed, 
he included the Ninth Amendment in order to guard against any implication 
that rights not specified in the Bill of Rights “were intended to be assigned 
into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently 
insecure.”203  Once one appreciates the original function of the Ninth 
Amendment, it is difficult to conclude that the Founders considered questions 
relating to individual rights to be qualitatively different from questions 
concerning the scope of federal powers.  To the contrary, the entire history of 
the Bill of Rights suggests that both Federalists and Antifederalists understood 
individual rights and limited federal powers to be flip sides of the same 
coin.204 
Given this understanding, there is little historical basis for Professor 
Kramer’s suggestion that the Founders intended courts to enforce individual 
rights but not to police the scope of federal powers.  In fact, if accepted, this 
dichotomy would give rise to the very danger that opponents of the Bill of 
Rights feared: courts would protect only those rights specified in the 
Constitution and leave Congress free to invade all other rights retained by the 
people.  The Antifederalists proposed—and the Federalists embraced—the 
Ninth Amendment precisely to avoid this result.  Thus, by whatever means 
one approaches the relevant history, the events surrounding the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights tend to refute—rather than support—Professor Kramer’s 
 
 199 McAffee, supra note 123, at 1225. 
 200 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 201 Kramer, supra note 4, at 40. 
 202 Id. at 39. 
 203 Debates in the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 152, at 69, 83; 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 163, at 456. 
 204 See McAffee, supra note 123, at 1226 (“The logic of the original Federalist 
objection to a bill of rights had been stated in terms of avoiding both enlarged powers and 
the elimination of retained rights: in this context, ‘rights’ and ‘powers’ are two sides of the 
same coin.”). 
  
2003] Unitary Judicial Review 351 
thesis.205 
Once one places the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in their historical 
context, it is not surprising that Madison considered both amendments 
essential to the preservation of individual liberty.  Commentators sometimes 
regard one or both amendments as out of place in the Bill of Rights.  The first 
eight amendments, it is said, deal with individual rights, whereas the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments concern only the collective rights of the people and 
the states.206  But once one recognizes that the Founders understood individual 
rights to depend primarily on the absence of federal power, it was at least as 
important to the cause of freedom for the Founders to limit federal power as it 
was to enumerate particular rights.  From this perspective, all ten amendments 
function to protect individual liberty against federal interference.  Thus, courts 
could not decline to review the scope of federal powers without necessarily 
failing to protect individual rights as understood by the Founders. 
The controversy surrounding the infamous Sedition Act207 provides an 
example.  In 1798, Federalists enacted a statute making it a crime to “write, 
print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious” words about 
the president or Congress.208  As Akhil Amar notes, the Sedition Act “was a 
textbook example of attempted self-dealing among the people’s agents; it 
criminalized libel of incumbents, but not challengers,” and it “conveniently 
provided for its own expiration after the next election.”209  Antifederalists, like 
James Madison, attacked the constitutionality of the Act.  In so doing, 
however, Madison did not rely exclusively—or even primarily—on the First 
Amendment.  Rather, his principal argument was that Congress lacked 
express or implied power to punish seditious libel or otherwise regulate the 
press.210 
The Sedition Act expired in 1801, thus denying the Supreme Court the 
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opportunity to consider its constitutionality.  Had a case reached the Court, 
however, Professor Kramer’s position suggests that the Court should have 
entertained arguments that the Act violated the First Amendment, but not that 
it exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers.  This undoubtedly would have 
surprised James Madison and would have left individuals prosecuted under 
the Act in a precarious position.  At the time, the First Amendment did not 
obviously apply to the Sedition Act because it “was regarded as guaranteeing 
nothing more than the common law definition of freedom of the press: the 
freedom to publish without prior restraint.”211  As numerous Founders 
recognized, the more fundamental protection of the freedom of the press 
flowed from the fact that the “power of Congress does not extend to the 
Press.”212 
Professor Kramer argues eloquently that the “special role of the Supreme 
Court in protecting individual rights scarcely needs justification.”213  He 
nonetheless goes on to explain, “Questions of individual right are, practically 
by definition, least well handled by majoritarian institutions and better dealt 
with in a forum whose structure and culture encourage deliberation and 
attention to principle over expediency or immediate interest.”214  The Sedition 
Act provides a glaring example of the threat posed by “majoritarian 
institutions” to individual liberty.  Yet, Professor Kramer’s ahistorical 
dichotomy between “rights” and “powers” would have deprived individuals 
prosecuted under the Act of effective judicial review. 
The limited nature of federal power, of course, does not merely protect 
the freedom of the press.  As the Founders expected, it would protect 
innumerable rights—such as the right to wear a hat, to marry, or to bury the 
dead—against federal interference.215  United States v. Lopez216 provides a 
modern example.  There, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal Gun-Free 
School Zones Act—criminalizing mere possession of guns in a school zone—
exceeded the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.217  This conclusion 
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made it unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the Act also violated 
the right “to keep and bear Arms” within the meaning of the Second 
Amendment.218  Assuming no Second Amendment violation, however, the 
only potential constitutional protection that Mr. Lopez had against 
interference by the federal government with his liberty was the limited nature 
of Congress’s powers.  Left to Congress’s unreviewable discretion, such 
liberty would be insecure.  Thus, like the rights enumerated in the first eight 
amendments, “others retained by the people” would also seem to be “better 
dealt with in a forum whose structure and culture encourage deliberation and 
attention to principle over expediency or immediate interest.”219  Lopez 
upholds this principle and gives continuing effect to the Founders’ 
understanding that “[l]iberty is secured . . . by the limitation of [federal] 
powers.”220 
Conclusion 
Professor Kramer has made important contributions to our understanding 
of judicial review through his exploration of its origins and development.  His 
suggestion that the propriety of judicial review turns on the nature of the 
constitutional provision at issue, however, is ultimately unpersuasive.  
Professor Kramer endorses judicial review to prevent states from interfering 
with federal supremacy and to enforce the Constitution’s rights-bearing 
provisions, but he disputes the historical basis for judicial review to police the 
limits of federal power.  This dichotomy collapses, however, in light of the 
text of the Supremacy Clause and the Founders’ understanding regarding the 
nature and source of individual rights vis-à-vis the federal government.  The 
Supremacy Clause permits courts to disregard state law only when it conflicts 
with a federal statute “made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution.”  Thus, of 
necessity, judicial review of state law often entails judicial review of the scope 
of federal powers.  Similarly, the Founders regarded the Bill of Rights as only 
a partial enumeration of rights.  The Ninth and Tenth Amendments confirm 
that the people retained other rights by virtue of their limited delegation of 
power to the federal government.  For this reason, courts cannot uphold the 
full range of individual rights contemplated by the Founders without taking a 
unitary approach to judicial review—that is, by enforcing both the Bill of 
Rights and the limits of federal power. 
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